Book Review: “The Clausewitz Delusion”, by Stephen Melton

"If the wits are right in dubbing Proust the world's most quoted and least read novelist, Clausewitz must be his non-fiction counterpart". That's what Richard Simpkin said about the popular understanding of On War, AKA “the” theory of war by Clausewitz. A lot of "the" theory of war is no longer relevant, Melton says, at least not the parts that the US Army has chosen to incorporate into its doctrine. The Clausewitz Delusion is a soul-searching tour de force on how and why the US Army came to its current struggle to achieve decisive victories in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the author the US Army, in its decades-long infatuation with Clausewitz’s On War, has forgotten what it once knew and now lacks “a sufficient understanding of the nature of warfare at the strategic, operational and tactical levels”.  “What the US Army once knew” is one of the masterfully delivered, extensively documented key concepts in this book and the chosen point of departure for the discussion of future doctrine. Melton calls for a return to the good old and successful American way of war and to stop enshrining the old writings of the famed Prussian. Clausewitz "could learn more from us than we could ever learn from him".

US Marines' Assault on Danahem: Close Combat is Here to Stay

The USMC, NATO and ANA forces joint assault on the Taliban-held village of Danahem (Afghanistan) is all over the news today.

A U.S. Marine of Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment fires on Taliban positions from a rooftop in the village of Dahaneh, Aug. 12, 2009 in the Helmand Province of Afghanistan. (AP Photo/Alfred De Montesquiou)
Used without permit or monetary gain. Comment to this entry for concerns about copyright infringement.

For civilians like me, details on how the assault was conducted at the tactical level are only available from the traditionally poor media reports.

A marine with Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment of the 2nd MEF, patrols the outskirts of the village of Khwaji Jamal, Aug. 10, 2009, in the Helmand Province of Afghanistan. (AP Photo/Julie Jacobson)
Used without permit or monetary gain. Comment to this entry for concerns about copyright infringement.

But something can be sorted out from those news stories.

"Marines were met with small arms, mortar and rocket propelled grenade fire as they flew in helicopters over Taliban lines and dropped into the town." CBS/AP

"... Marines rolled into the town despite roadside bomb attacks and gunfire." CBS/AP

Our Marines pushed through and got really close with the Taliban. In a certain way this is no surprise, the small-units tactical doctrine of the USMC recognizes that there is no substitute for close combat.

From the above quotes and if one takes the media reports face value, apparently the Marines maneuvered through the Taliban without gaining fire superiority. I'm not talking here about shooting back at the Taliban who opened fire at the incoming troops but rather to the old American-style better-safe-than-sorry, all-out type of fire superiority. Do you guys remember the old saying: "Fire without maneuver is indecisive, maneuver without fire is fatal"? That saying is even on one USMC doctrinal publication for small units! Part of this apparent departure from old time SOPs can potentially be explained by the concerns to harm the civilian population. Take a look at this other snippet:

"Martin [Captain, Golf Co, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines] said the Marines had devised tactics to minimize civilian casualties in the densely populated area. He said troops would strictly limit the type of weapons they used and would stick to a "proportional response" when under fire." CBS/AP

If this is true I can't even imagine the effort and the increased risk faced by our troops while changing their drills and tactical stance from soldiers killing militants to SWAT cops liberating hostages. I can only commend the sacrifices they make for our nation.

And finally, the always controversial point of air support for fighting insurgents.

"U.S. Marine Harrier jets streaking overhead and dropping flares in a show of force." CBS/AP

I find it hard to believe that these aircraft were there just as a show of force. But the fact that apparently they didn't have to drop ordinance on the town is good news.

As time passes, stories from this battle will start to come by.

On the meantime: Semper Fi!

Suggested reading:

Let's Get Closer: Remembering the Relevance of Close Combat
By Lt. Col. Robert R. Leonhard, U.S. Army retired
Army Magazine September 2004

On War #293: The Price of Bad Tactics
By William Lind, February 2009
(Discusses the relationship of poor infantry tactics and the excessive reliance on close air support)

Cheers,

The British Army Tactical Doctrine is ... What?

At least for me, the great thing about playing around with simulators and war games is trying to understand what the real deal is all about. I'm just so fond of this approach to the hobby that I like to browse military doctrinal publications and field manuals. There is plenty doctrinal publications out there from the US Army and the US Marine Corps, and so far I never found a shortage of material for a well-read tactical war gaming session involving US land forces.

Right now, I have two war games on my desk that are waiting to be played with some minimal doctrinal backbone: "Battle Group Commander: Episode One" and "Combat Mission Shock Force: British Forces".

Unfortunately, it turns out that the British Army tactical doctrine is ... classified! (?)


The publications that compose the British Army military doctrine have been consolidated in the so-called "British Army Electronic Battle Box". Allegedly, "the box" is 7 CDs that are only available to British servicemen and MoD personnel.


I would bet that in general terms, the British Army tactical doctrine is not that different from the one of the US Army and US Marine Corps. There are tactical drills which are almost universal. However, if one browses the scenarios included in the games I mention above, the organization and equipment of the British Army suggests that there have to be some particular things they do differently than their US counterparts.

For a complete ignorant on this topic like me, there are at least some nice sources to start learning about the real life operations of the British Army (see the attached images).

Cheers,

An M3/M1 Hunter-Killer Plt in a Hasty Attack: Learning to Punch with the Fingers Spread

The AAR that I started here (split in several parts), is now consolidated in the
"Real and Simulated Wars-Companion Website".

Please follow this link to the entire AAR.

Cheers,

An M3/M1 Hunter-Killer Team in a Hasty Attack: Learning to Punch with the Fingers Spread (Part 4)

Around 6:51, all teams are at the edge of the palm trees, scanning west before moving on.

An artillery barrage falls over team 4-A (center group, 2 M3 CFVs). Team 4-A pulls back to safety un-harmed. The enemy has seen us. There must be some infantry OPs somewhere.

Team 4-A pulls back to avoid the artillery fire.

With the certainty that the enemy has seen us, I order everybody to wait for a couple of minutes, and scan the terrain west. No victors out there.

I am a bit scared of letting both teams 2-A and 3-A to start moving west. I choose team 2-A (north flank) as the one to move on first because its avenue of infiltration/penetration is closer to the limit of our sector. If something nasty happens during their approach, they can move north to safety relatively fast.

Team 2-A moves up

Team 2-A advances northwest through a small valley. Formation column, with the tank up front. Because the terrain now is a bit more closed, I want to make sure that if contact is to happen during the march, a tank is the first thing the enemy faces

Another artillery barrage, now on team 3-A (southern flank), produces the first loss. An M3 CFV falls prey to the fire from the sky. This is not a good start.

Team 3-A suffers the first loss.

Fortunately, team 2-A (northern flank) advances unopposed.

Another view of the advance of team 2-A

It’s now 6:55 and the time of deploying the “hunters” of team 2-A has come.

Situation at 6:55. Note team 2-A's advance.

To be continued ...

Cheers,

An An M3/M1 Hunter-Killer Plt in a Hasty Attack: Learning to Punch with the Fingers Spread (Part 2)

The Plan

We are deep in the desert. Right in front of us there is a small valley, oddly scattered with palm trees. West of that valley, the hills we have to clear. Once we get inside this hilly terrain, long range engagements (in which we have such an awesome edge) will be impossible. Whatever happens in the hills, it will be a knife-fight. It's early in the morning and a moderate sandstorm has limited the visibility to 1 km.

Based on the light resistance we found in the last hours and the lack of prepared enemy defenses, the enemy forces are likely conducting a mobile security mission. One hour ago, our Sqn command group has destroyed two PCs and one tank (see reference points in the map). At least 4 T-72s and 5 BMPs were seen hastily moving west.

Our task is to clear the enemy from the sector indicated in the map and restore the screen line.

Forces available for this mission are a US Cav Plt (6 M3 CFV, 2 M1 MBT) which I organized as a Hunter-Killer Plt (see previous post). The Squadron's aerial component is grounded until the climate conditions improve. We have no indirect fire support available for this mission.

My scheme of maneuver is, sequentially:
1) Clear the valley with the whole Hunter-Killer (HK) Plt
2) Infiltrate or force a penetration of the hilly terrain via small valleys/low terrain at the north and southern extremes of the sector with HK teams 2A and 3A
3) Teams 2A and 3A conduct mutually supported HK missions to find and destroy the enemy forces. Team 4A (2 M3 CFVs) stays back in the small valley, alerts of any enemy movement in the west part of the sector and stays ready to reinforce HK operations of teams 2A and 3A

H-K and HK: Hunter-Killer tactics; click the image for an expanded view

The infiltration/penetration of the hilly terrain of 3A HK team (southern flank) could have been made a bit more down south, near the southern edge of the sector. I opted for a small low terrain entrance a bit north than that because I wanted to make sure that team 3A could support team 2A.

Coming up next: the execution

Cheers,

An M3/M1 Hunter-Killer Plt in a Hasty Attack: Learning to Punch with the Fingers Spread (Part 1)

Man schlägt jemanden mit der Faust und nicht mit gespreizten Fingern. (You hit somebody with your fist and not with your fingers spread.) Heinz Guderian
Meaning that you should concentrate your Panzers for one mighty push in one direction and not distribute them over a large area. From WikiQuotes.

The action described below is from a custom-made Steel Beasts ProPE scenario featuring a US Cavalry Plt tasked with filling a gap in a screen line.

This scenario is loosely based in the actions of the 2nd Plt, A Troop, 1-4 US Cavalry near objective Norfolk during the Gulf War. During the early hours of 27 Feb 1991, 1-4 US Cav was conducting a screen mission for 1 ID. The S3 of the unit, Major John Burdan became aware that A and B Troops have been inadvertently moving away from each other while moving to establish the screen line. Thus, a gap in the screen line was generated. The 1st Squadron commander (LTC Robert Wilson) decided to inspect the screen line personally, taking along one M3 and an M113. This command group found a dug-in Iraqi T-72 and quickly dispatched it. Soon it became evident that BMPs and T-72s were behind the 1st Squadron's screen line. Lacking the firepower needed to clear this enemy group, the 2nd Plt of A Troop (2LT Adrian Lowndes) was called in to clear the enemy positions and to re-establish de screen line. More details can be found at "The Road to Safwan", by Bourque and Burdan (pages 151 to 153).

Please keep in mind "loosely based". This scenario is not an historical recreation. Over time, I profusively edited the scenario and kept getting rid of the many difficulties the Troopers of 1-4 US Cav have encountered in real-life. Navigation in an almost featurless desert, with few GPS units, with 1/500,000 maps and at night. How they did it, it escapes my comprehension. To make it up for my scenario's numerous excesses, I situated the action during a moderate sandstorm (low visibility), with no air support and no indirect fires availble for blue. I made the gap in the screen almost 4 km wide. I also reinforced the Iraqis with two plts of T-72s and three plt(-) of BMPs, all deployed in depth with infantry-manned OPs up front. I also gave the Iraqis random start positions and two crude plans of armored counter-attack which are triggered based in the reports by the infantry OPs.

The main purpose of editing and playing this scenario was to learn how to use hunter-killer teams in a hasty attack. M3/M1 hunter-killer teams have been widely used by US Cavalry formations during both Iraq wars. For this scenario, I have an US Cav Plt composed of 6 M3 CFVs and 2 M1 MBTs. I organized this Plt as described in an article that appeared in the Armor magazine, back in 1993.

The Hunter-Killer Cavalry Platoon, as described in Armor magazine. (Click the image for an expanded view)

Without further ado, the mission.

The tactical situation. (Click on the image for an expanded view)

The blue units at the north and south extremes of the map, are part of the squadron's screen line and they are out of my control. The gap between both of them is where enemy presence is suspected. The units is at the eastern extreme of the map are part of my Plt. You will have excuse me in that each of them show Plt symbols and nomenclature. They are all just part of the same US Cav Plt. Units 3-A and 2-A have a tank symbol but they are actually composed of 1 M1 MBT and 2 M3 CFVs. This is the first time I use the new mixed units feature of v2.146! :)

The task is to execute a "clear" tactical mission and re-establish the screen line (dotted arrows located at the western edge). The "clear" tactical mission is ussualy executed after very careful planning and is supported with multiple assets. Clearly not the case for this scenario, but I'm claiming METTTC considerations. :)

To be continued ...

Cheers,

The "Tactics 101" Series at Armchair General

For all of us looking for quality reading material about military tactics, Armchair General has been offering the "Tactics 101" series since 2006.

These articles cover a lot of tactical mileage and are written by two professional soldiers. This articles consolidate a lot of information spread across several US Army and US Marine Corps doctrinal publications.

Armchair General should consider putting all these articles together, print them and sell them as a stand-alone supplement. It would be a pity if this material gets lost in some website transition or archiving.

Cheers,

"Tank Tactics, from Normandy to Lorraine", by Roman Jarymowycz

Just finished reading this book.

"Tank Tactics, from Normandy to Lorraine", by Roman Jarymowycz is a wonderful mix of scholastic treatise on armor doctrine and engaging battlefront stories and anecdotes.

This book is about the evolution of armor doctrine among the US and Canadian forces, from the end of WWI to the trying months after the WWII Normandy landings.

This is a must read for anybody interested in armored warfare. The first chapters are devoted to the post-WWI years, and all the confusion the tank brought into military doctrine. How were tanks to be used grand-tactically, as a breaktrhough ram, as an exploitation weapon or as a pursuit one? The soul-searching of the US Cavalry with their tank vs horse debate follows, with a bit less of detail as in other books by Jarymowycz but nonetheless very informative. The meat and potatoes of the book is the analysis of Operations Goodwood, Cobra, Totalize and Tractable. The author makes great emphasis in the good and bad of the doctrines of British, Canadian, US, German and (altough very briefly) Soviet forces. Every operation is put under the microscope and analyzed from the armored warfare doctrinal point of view. I would dare to say that this is the best operational analysis of the Normandy breakthrough I ever read.

One word of caution: the title "Tank Tactics" is a bit off. The book makes emphasis in the grand-tactical and operational use of armor in WWII. There are a few tactical vignettes here and there. But don't expect to see too much small units tactics here.

On a side note: This book has been available from Lynne-Rienner Publishers for a long time. Now Stackpole Books prints and sells it at a lower price. Kudos Stackpole for getting us this wonderful scholarly treatise at such a knockout price.

This book has given me an itch for some WWII Normandy war-gaming ...




Do you recognize this war game?


HPS's Normandy 44








What about this classic?


Combat Mission: Beyond Overlord




I'm off to play these great war games.

Cheers,

FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency

After being published and quickly taken off from the US Army Combined Arms Center last April, copies of the manual appeared in several blogs and websites.

Now it is available from the "Small Wars Journal" website.

It is very exciting to witness doctrine in the making.

The field manual is 300 pages long and I'm still reading it. Two stray thoughts about it:

• From the point of view of employing armed forces to kill insurgents/enemy combatants the US Army never suffered major tactical defeats in the recent past. This field manual not only revises the employment of troops for the destruction of enemy combatants/insurgents but also integrates such activity with wining the hearts and minds of the civil population and preserving the civilian infrastructure. This is not a trivial thing.
• Some parts are really eye catchers. Like this passage in section 5.2 (Characteristics of the Offense):

  The characteristics of the offense are surprise, audacity, tempo, and concentration. For COIN, an additional characteristic, flexibility, is added.

Wait a minute, I thought that flexibility was always a part of the offense ... :)

• Some other parts are surprising, at least to me. Like when the manual lists the types of offensive operations, one of them is "movement to contact", which includes search-and-attack and cordon-and-search operations. In my understanding, the greatest problem in battling insurgencies is that the enemy combatants always have the choice of when and where to show up. Movement to contact may be a bit too optimistic IMHO. But the actual surprise to me is that in the manual there is a mention of using reconnaissance forces to find the insurgents. Regular recce units?
  

Cheers,